Analysis and Evaluation of Incentive Compatible Dynamic Mechanisms for Carrier Collaboration by Figliozzi, Miguel Andres
 I T L S 
 
INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and 
LOGISTICS STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre in 
Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program.
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITLS-WP-06-07 
 
 
Analysis and Evaluation of 
Incentive Compatible 
Dynamic Mechanisms for 
Carrier Collaboration 
 
 
By 
 
Miguel Andres Figliozzi 
 
April 2006 
 
 
Submitted to the 85th Annual Meeting of the 
Transportation Research Board 
 
 
ISSN  1832-570X 
 
NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-06-07 
 
TITLE: Analysis and Evaluation of Incentive Compatible Dynamic 
Mechanisms for Carrier Collaboration 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper introduces a framework for carrier dynamic 
collaboration. In particular it proposes and analyzes dynamic 
collaborative mechanisms that are incentive compatible. The 
dynamic collaborative environment is characterized by a set of 
carriers that have a proprietary set of customers that generate a 
stream of random demands over time. The proposed 
collaborative mechanism is such that upon each demand arrival, 
each carrier has the incentive to submit the arrived shipment or 
service request to the collaborative mechanism. Intuition about 
the efficiency and workings of the collaborative mechanism is 
developed. A general framework to formulate and study 
collaborative frameworks among transportation carriers is 
proposed. A truckload pickup-and-delivery collaborative 
environment is simulated and results are analyzed.  
 
KEY WORDS: Freight transportation, urban freight demand, carrier 
behaviour, shipper behaviour, vehicle routing problem, 
commercial vehicle traffic, urban logistics & commercial 
freight activities 
 
AUTHORS: Miguel Andres Figliozzi 
  
CONTACT: Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies  (C37) 
 An Australian Key Centre 
The University of Sydney   NSW   2006   Australia 
 
 Telephone: +61 9351 0071 
 Facsimile:  +61 9351 0088 
 E-mail:  itlsinfo@itls.usyd.edu.au 
 Internet:  http://www.itls.usyd.edu.au 
 
DATE: April 2006 
 
 
Analysis and Evaluation of Incentive Compatible Dynamic Mechanisms for Carrier Collaboration 
Figliozzi 
 
1 
1
1.  Introduction 
Of current significance to the fields of logistics and supply chain is the concept of 
collaboration, enabled and partly driven by the extensive advances and changes in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) that have taken place in the last few 
decades. For example, supply chain collaborative processes such as Collaborative Planning 
Forecasting and Replenishment [1] make possible joint sales forecasting and replenishment 
planning between trading partners; enabling participants to share improvements in 
inventory costs, revenue, and customer service levels.  
 
Collaboration is not only an attempt to find win-win solutions to conflicting objectives but 
also an integration of behavioral, communicational, and interactive flows [1]. Clearly, an 
important indicator of the viability of voluntary collaboration is the ability to find synergies 
that reduce operating costs. Strategic collaborations, effective coordination, and 
streamlined supply chain networks are key factors by which companies thrive in today's 
competitive business environment [2]. In other instances, collaboration is induced by 
governmental regulation as in the case of urban consolidation to reduce truck traffic in 
urban environments [3]. Internet based collaborative initiatives that aim at cost reduction 
through collaboration has spawned in recent years. For example Nistevo1 is a web based 
collaborative portal that allows shippers to reduce transportation costs; when shippers join 
their demands or requests economies of scope or scale can be obtained. On the carrier 
side, web based initiatives like Transplace2 (a joint effort of six major USA based carriers) 
aim at providing a common transactional point for shippers and carriers.  
 
Collaboration brings about synergistic opportunities but also challenges as the problems 
grow in size and complexity. Rules and protocols are needed to regulate cooperative 
activity and to reduce unnecessary information overload and delays. This paper introduces 
a framework for carrier dynamic collaboration. In particular it proposes and analyzes 
dynamic collaborative mechanisms (CM) that are incentive compatible (IC). The dynamic 
collaborative environment is characterized by a set of carriers that have a proprietary set of 
customers that generate a stream of random demands over time. The proposed 
collaborative mechanism is such that upon each demand arrival, each carrier has the 
incentive to submit the arrived shipment or service request to the collaborative mechanism.  
 
Among the vast array of possible collaborative mechanisms with different payment, 
allocation, and trust structures3, this research focuses on IC mechanisms. In IC 
mechanisms carriers submit (truthfully) only their cost estimations, they do not shade the 
value of their prices or bids’ taking into account what the competition is likely to do. Such 
kind of mechanism has several advantages: 1) costs are easier to compute than prices, 2) 
the resulting mechanisms are conceptually simple to understand and implement, and 3) 
carriers’ best strategy is independent of the competition strategies.  These advantages are 
extremely useful in a dynamic environment where price estimation problems can easily 
become intractable or computationally expensive. Carriers have the incentive to invest on 
technologies to reduce costs and/or better estimate them. In addition, cost pricing is a 
more efficient auction mechanism than 1st price pricing in a sequential transport 
marketplace [4].   
 
                                                          
1 www.nistevo.com 
2 www.transplace.com 
3 The term trust structures refers to the collection of policies used in a system to determine the trustworthiness of the participants 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes previous work related to 
collaborative mechanisms and collaborative mechanisms in transportation. The 
collaborative framework and notation is introduced in the third section. Section four 
describes different collaborative scenarios studied in this paper. Section five describes the 
simulation framework developed to illustrate and evaluate the collaboration mechanism 
through numerical experiments. Experimental results are also analyzed and discussed in 
section five, followed by concluding comments in the final section.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
A collaborative agreement cannot be established without clear rules that assure 
sustainability and ensure service fulfillment and control. Considerable effort is required to 
concur in an arrangement (collaborative rules) that satisfies the numerous participation and 
rationality constraints. 
 
A collaborative outcome that benefits all parties is a necessary condition to facilitate 
collaboration although this is a not a sufficient condition; this is clearly illustrated in the 
archetypical prisoner’s dilemma [5]. Carriers cannot be assumed to cooperate or sustain a 
collaborative outcome unless they have the incentive to do so. Unfortunately, in general it 
is impossible to simultaneously achieve perfect efficiency (PE), budget balanced (BB)4, 
incentive compatibility (IC), and individual rationality (IR) in a two sided negotiation with 
self interested agents, as shown by Myerson and Satterhwaite [6]. Mechanisms based on 
marginal cost allocations such as the Vickrey-Clark-Grooves mechanism are efficient, 
individually rational,  and incentive compatible, but not budget balanced [7]. In general, it is 
impossible to obtain simultaneously these four highly desirable conditions.  
 
The advent of the internet has spurred the development of collaborative mechanisms 
mainly in the computer science literature. However, the particular characteristics of 
dynamic freight transportation systems  preclude the direct transference of models from 
other fields [8]. Computer science and supply chain literature agent based coordination 
models are reviewed in Sandholm [9] and Wu [10] respectively. Modeling approaches 
proposed in the artificial intelligence literature for freight transportation focus on 
“decommitment” strategies. Fisher et al. [11] and Burckert et al. [12] present a model where 
companies can break agreements  at any time, at the cost of a prenegotiated penalty, in 
order to take more profitable shipments. Decommitment simplifies calculations 
considerably but cannot guarantee meeting shipments time windows. In reality, 
decommitment is unacceptable for shippers who highly value on time delivery performance 
[13]. Decommitment is particularly unrealistic in Just-In-Time (JIT) environments where 
penalties for late deliveries can exceed several times the cost of the service. Furthermore, a 
poor on-time delivery record or excessive variability can lead to the non-renewal of 
transportation contracts or even contract cancellations.  
 
An electronic brokerage system for the trucking industry is proposed by Kim and Lee [14]. 
The paper suggests an efficient auction-based method for matching delivery tasks with 
trucks. The problem is formulated from the point of view of the market maker but without 
analyzing IC, IR, or BB issues. The closest work to this research is the paper by Song and 
                                                          
4 Restricting the mechanism to be BB precludes the use of external financial support (a subsidy) to sustain the operation of the 
collaborative mechanism 
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Reagan about an auction based, post-contract, collaboration mechanism [15]. In this work 
it is assumed that a group of carriers with overlapping service areas choose to collaborate; 
every time a carrier obtains a load he/she evaluates if the load is cost-effective to serve.  If 
the load is not cost effective, the carrier estimates a reservation value and asks the other 
carriers to submit their bids. The shipment allocation/payment is completed using a 2nd 
price auction but the treatment of the problem is essentially static.   
 
This research is different from previous research in several aspects: 1) mechanism is 
dynamic, 2) the mechanism is incentive compatible, 3) there is a detailed treatment of 
payment and information issues that ensure IC constraints as well as the discussion of 
efficiencies, and 4) simulation results of the mechanism in are presented and analyzed.  
 
 
3.  Market Description and Notation 
 
The dynamic collaborative environment is characterized by a set of carriers that have a 
proprietary set of customers that generate a stream of random demands over time5.  The 
challenge for IR collaborative mechanisms is to ensure that each carrier has the incentive to 
participate in the CM upon each demand arrival.  
 
The formulation presented below allows for a more precise discussion of the main issues in 
a dynamic collaborative mechanism. It is assumed that there are n  carriers collaborating 
using a collaborative mechanism (CM) M c; a carrier is denoted by i∈ℑ  
where {1,2,..., }nℑ=  is the set of all carriers. Each carrier has its own set of customers that 
request transportation services dynamically. Let the arrival or request announcement 
epochs for carrier i  be 1 2{ , ,..., }
i i i
Nt t t  such that 1
i i
k kt t +<  and iNt  denotes the time of the last 
arriving shipment for carrier i .  Let 1 2{ , ,..., }
i i i i
k kS s s s=  be the set of arriving shipments for 
carrier i  up to time ikt , then 1 2{ , ,..., }
i i i i
N NS s s s= . Arrival times and shipments are not known 
in advance. The arrival epochs 1 2{ , ,..., }
i i i
Nt t t follow a general arrival process. Furthermore, 
arrival times and shipments are assumed to come from a probability space ( , , )i i iΩ F P , 
with outcomes 1 2{ , ,..., }
i i i
Nω ω ω , therefore { , }i i it t tt sω =  and let 1 2{ , ,..., }i i iNt t t t∈ .  
 
The fleet status of carrier i  when shipment its  arrives is denoted as
i
tz , which comprises 
two different sets: itS
(
 (set of shipments hold by carrier i  which are not fully served at 
time t ) and itV  (which is the set of vehicles in the fleet of carrier i
6). There is a state or 
assignment function such that at time t  the status of carrier i  is 1a ( , )
i i i
t t tz h z −= . Let th  
denote the history of allocations done through the CM up to but not including allocations 
at time t . Each carrier has a cost function c ( , )i ij js z  that estimates the cost (incremental) 
of serving a new shipment ijs  when the status of the fleet is
i
jz .  
 
                                                          
5 In general, the mechanism proposed applies to any kind of dynamic demand steam or customer requests that can be swapped 
among carriers without significantly affecting customer service (see discussion in page 10). In particular, results obtained from the 
application of the mechanism to a truckload pickup-and-delivery service with time windows are discussed in pages 10 and 11 
6 Shipment attributes: origin, destination, time windows, penalties for late deliveries, etc - Vehicle attributes: current location, 
status (empty or loaded), driver constraints (hours/miles worked), etc 
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Assuming deterministic travel times, the fleet status at a given time is a function of the 
previous fleet status, the history of collaboration, and the fleet management function a i . 
The history of collaborations th  is the time based record of all shipment transfers among 
carriers up to time t . Each carrier i  has private information (a ,c , , , , )i i i i i i i it t tS Vθ = Ω( F P  
at time t . 
 
When an event triggers a collaborative call (usually a shipment arrival) carriers send private 
information i it tSϑ ⊆ (  to the CM. For each possible element of itϑ  the carrier submits a 
reservation value. For a shipment its , a reservation value ( )
i
ty s
+∈   is a positive real number 
and denotes the maximum monetary value that a carrier is willing to pay to another carrier 
for servicing a shipment sent to the CM.  For each element in itϑ  each carrier submits a 
reservation cost ( )ite s .  For a shipment
i
ts , a reservation cost ( )
i
te s
+∈   is a positive real 
number that denotes the minimum monetary value that carrier i  is willing to charge 
another carrier for servicing a shipment sent to the CM.  
 
Reservation costs and values must include all relevant costs (including opportunity costs) 
associated with servicing (or not servicing) an additional shipment or shipments. It is 
assumed that all participating carriers compute these costs accurately. It is also assumed 
that if a carrier cannot meet the shipment delivery conditions (e.g. time windows) the 
submitted reservation cost is ( )ite s = ∞  or a sufficiently high number that is larger than the 
reservation value. It is assumed that carriers trigger a collaborative call as soon as a new 
request arrives.  
 
4.  IC Dynamic Collaborative Framework 
 
Herein, it is assumed that shipments, reservation values, and reservation costs are 
submitted and processed by the CM in real time in a first-in-first-out fashion. The 
proposed mechanism is called Second Price based Dynamic Collaborative Mechanism 
(SPDCM). The term “second price” is used because the workings of the SPDCM are 
inspired by the workings of the one item (static) second price (OISP) auction.  The OISP 
auction is incentive compatible and achieves perfect efficiency [7]. This is possible because 
the monetary value (price) that the winning buyer pays is not influenced by the value of the 
winning bid. This key idea is used in the SPDCM to maintain incentive compatibility 
throughout the collaboration process. It is applied to the dynamic mechanism for bundle 
size 1 (the CM requests reservation costs for at most one shipment per collaborative 
instance) and to the dynamic mechanism for bundle size 2 (the CM requests reservation 
costs for at most two shipments per collaborative instance; a carrier can submit reservation 
costs for each individual shipment or the combined bundle). These dynamic mechanisms 
and their properties are described henceforth.  
 
4.1  Bundle size 1 
 
When the bundle size is 1, each carrier can submit at most one reservation cost and only 
one carrier can submit a shipment to the CM.  In the proposed SPDCM a carrier i  
submits a just arrived shipment ijs  and its reservation value ( )
i
jy s  to the CM. The other 
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carriers, denoted by i− , independently submit reservation costs which form the 
set 1 1 1( ) { ( ),...., ( ), ( ),..., ( )}i i i i i i i N ij j j j je s e s e s e s e s
− − += . The set ( )ije sℑ  is formed adding the 
set of reservation costs and reservation values,  
1 1 1( ) { ( ),...., ( ), ( ), ( ),..., ( )}i i i i i i i N ij j j j j je s e s e s y s e s e s
ℑ − +=   
 
Let the ordered version of this set be denoted ( ) (1) ( )( ) { ( ),..., ( )}i i N ij j je s e s e s
ℑ =  where 
(1) ( )ije s denotes value of the lowest element of the set ( )
i
je s
ℑ , (2) ( )ije s  the second lowest 
value of the set ( )ije s
ℑ , and so on until ( ) ( )N ije s  represents the highest element of the 
set ( )ije s
ℑ . The term ( )( )i kjs  refers to the carrier that occupies the k
th position, carrier (k), 
in the ordered set ( ) ( )ije s
ℑ . The CM works as follows: 
 
1. Carrier i  submits a just arrived shipment ijs  and its private (secret) reservation value  
( )ijy s  
2. The CM informs the other carriers (denoted by i− ) of shipment ijs  arrivals 
3. The carries independently submit reservation costs that will comprise ( )i ije s
−  
4. The CM forms the ordered set ( ) ( )ije s
ℑ  
5.  If (2) (2) (3)( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i ij j j j je s y s or y s e s e s< = =  then carrier (1) is going to serve 
shipment ijs  and will be paid an amount equal to 
(2) ( )ije s  
6. Otherwise, (2) ( ) ( )i ij je s y s≥ , the shipment is served by carrier i . 
 
4.2  Bundle size 1: Pricing Strategies and Properties 
 
The proposed SPDCM inherits the BB, IR, and IC, properties of the second price auction. 
The IC property is conserved because it is optimal for the carriers to submit their 
respective incremental service costs as reservation values and costs. Two distinct cases are 
possible: a) the carrier submits a shipment and reservation value, and b) the carrier submits 
a reservation cost. In case a) there are three possible sub-scenarios: a.1) the carrier submits 
a reservation value higher than his/her own service cost, a.2) the carrier submits a 
reservation value equal to his/her service cost and a.3) the carrier submits a reservation 
value lower than his/her own service cost. A submission as in a.1) cannot be optimal since 
the carrier creates the possibility of paying more that what it costs to serve the shipment 
himself/herself. A submission as in a.3) cannot be optimal since the carrier decreases the 
possibility of (2) ( ) ( )i ij je s y s<  taking place and does not decrease his payment which is 
(2) ( )ije s . In case b) there are also three possible sub-scenarios: b.1) the carrier submits a 
reservation cost higher than his/her service cost, b.2) the carrier submits a reservation cost 
equal to his /her service cost and b.3) the carrier submits a reservation cost lower than 
his/her service cost. The same logic as in case a) applies. A submission as in b.1) cannot be 
optimal since the carrier decreases the possibility of being carrier (1) without changing 
payment value (2) ( )ije s . A submission as in b.3) cannot be optimal since the carrier submits 
a reservation cost that is lower than his/her own service cost. Therefore, submitting 
reservation values and costs equal to the service costs is a weakly dominant strategy.  
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The BB and IR property is maintained because no carrier ever pays more than his/her 
reservation value. The mechanism is IR since reservation costs and reservation values are 
always respected; no carrier is forced to receive less or pay more than what he or she is 
willing to accept.  The mechanism is also BB since payments never exceed the reservation 
value of the carrier offering the shipment to the CM.  
 
Full efficiency cannot be guaranteed in a dynamic environment as in a one-item auction. 
There are two sources of inefficiencies: a) the necessity to keep IC property, and b) the 
impossibility to ensure ex-post efficiency (dynamic problem). The former case of 
inefficiency takes place when (1) (2) (3)( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i ij j j je s y s e s e s< = < ; since (3) ( ) ( )i ij je s y s> and 
(2) ( ) ( )i ij je s y s=  the shipment is served by carrier i  (as indicated by point 6 of SPDCM). In 
this case it would have been more efficient if carrier (1)( )ijs  had served the shipment. This 
type of inefficiency is necessary in order to ensure that the monetary value (price) paid to 
the winning carrier is not influenced by the value of the winning bid or the reservation 
value. Otherwise, if carrier i  knows that the payment is somehow dependent on his 
reservation value he/she will be tempted to shade his submission and violate the IC 
condition. This type of consideration was first hinted by Vickrey [16] in his seminal paper 
about the workings of 1st and 2nd price auctions  and more recently employed by Ausubel 
and Cramton [17] to maintain efficiency in a multiunit second price auction.  
 
The second type of inefficiency may take place even when (1) (2)( ) ( ) ( )i i ij j je s e s y s< <  and 
the shipment is assigned to carrier (1)( )ijs . This assignment is ex-ante efficient (based on the 
cost expectations that each individual carriers have at time jt ) but in general it cannot be 
guaranteed that this would be an ex-post efficient assignment. This type of inefficiency is 
common to all stochastic systems since it would be avoided only if future realizations could 
be flawlessly predicted.   
 
The objective of the SPDCM is to maximize system profit in the CM subject to BB, IR, 
and IC constraints. This is done in line 5 with the assignment of the shipment to the carrier 
with the lowest price. The generated system profit is denoted (1)( ) ( ) ( )i i ij j js y s e sσ = − . The 
system profit maximization problem can be expressed as: 
max ( )ij js xσ  
 
s.t.     
 
(2)( ) ( )i ij j jy s e s x≥ , and {0,1}jx ∈  
 
where jx is the only decision variable. If 1jx =  shipment ijs  is allocated to carrier (1) who 
pays (2) ( )ije s  to carrier i ; otherwise, 0jx = , shipment ijs  is served by carrier i .  
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4.3  Bundle size 2 
 
In this case, CM collects reservation values and costs for up to two shipments (including 
possible bundles) and selects the best “packing” or allocation of carriers to shipments. If 
several shipments are offered simultaneously a problem similar to a combinatorial auction 
is brought about. However, the dynamic aspects of the problem significantly change the 
implementation of the CM.   
 
Let 1 2{ , ,..., }
i
k k i kS s s s S∈ℑ= = ∪  be the set of all arriving shipments to the carriers that 
participate in the CM, arranged in ascending order of arrival and up to time 1kt +  but not 
including shipment 1ks + . Without loss of generality, let’s assume that the first arrivals are 
for carriers i and j respectively. The CM bundles the shipments so 1ϑℑ =∅  (no action taken 
at time 1t ) and 2 1 2{ , }s sϑℑ = , where 1 1 1 2,i js s s s= = . Defining 
 
(1)
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )s y s e sσ = −  
(1)
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )s y s e sσ = −  
(1)
1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )s s y s y s e s sσ = + −  
 
The system profit maximization problem is: 
 
1 1 2 2 1 2 12max ( ) ( ) ( , )s x s x s s xσ σ σ+ +  
s.t.     
(2)
1 1 1( ) ( )y s e s x≥   
(2)
2 2 2( ) ( )y s e s x≥  
(2) (2) (2)
1 2 1 2 1 2 12( ) ( ) min( ( , ) , ( ) ( ) )y s y s e s s e s e s x+ > +  
1 12 1x x+ ≤  
2 12 1x x+ ≤  
and 1 2 12, , {0,1}x x x ∈  
 
The SPDCM works as follows: 
 
1. Carrier i  submits a just arrived shipment 1s  at time 1t  and indicates that it is willing 
to wait up to time 1t +  (time deadline) to form a bundle. 
2. The CM keeps the information and does not inform the other carriers about it.  
3. If the next shipment does not arrive before the deadline, 1 1 2
jt t t+ < = , there is no 
possibility of bundling.  Shipment 1
is  is offered by the CM at time 1t +  as a bundle of size 1.  
4. If 1 1 2
jt t t+ ≥ = , then at time 2t  carrier i is asked by the CM to submit 1 1( ) ( )iy s y s=  and 
carrier j submits 1 2
js s= , 2t + , and 1 2( ) ( )jy s y s= . 
5. The CM forms 1 2 1 1( , ) ( ) ( )
i jy s s y s y s= + . 
6. At time 2t , the CM informs: 
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a.  the other carriers (all but carrier i and j) of shipments 1 2{ , }s s  arrivals; 
b. carrier i about shipment 2{ }s ; and 
c. carrier j about shipment 1{ }s . 
7. The carries independently submit reservation costs: 
a. Each of the carriers k∈ℑ  such that ,k i k j≠ ≠ submits three reservation 
costs: 1 2( , )
ke s s , 1( )
ke s , and 2( )
ke s . 
b. Carriers i submits reservation costs 2( )
ie s  and 1 2( , )
ie s s . 
c. Carriers j submits reservation costs 1( )
je s  and 1 2( , )
je s s . 
8. The CM forms the ordered sets ( ) 1( )e s
ℑ , ( ) 2( )e s
ℑ , and ( ) 1 2( , )e s s
ℑ . 
9. The CM maximizes system profits (optimize system profits using decision 
variables 1 2 12, ,x x x ). 
10. Allocations and payments depends on the values of 1 2 12, ,x x x : 
a. If 1 1x = , then carrier (1)1( )s  -- the carrier with the lowest rate for 1s   – is going to 
serve shipment 1s  and will be paid an amount equal to 
*(1) (1) (2)
1 2 2 2 1min ( ( , ) ( ) , ( ))e s s e s x e s
− − . The notation *−  is used to indicate that the winner, 
carrier that submitted (1) 1( )e s , is excluded from the sets that may determine the payment 
level   
b. If 2 1x = , then carrier (1)2( )s  -- the carrier with the lowest rate for 2s   – is going to 
serve shipment 2s  and will be paid an amount equal to. 
*(1) (1) (2)
1 2 1 1 2min ( ( , ) ( ) , ( ))e s s e s x e s
− − . The notation *−  is used to indicate that the winner, 
carrier that submitted (1) 2( )e s , is excluded from the sets that may determine the payment 
level. 
c. If 12 1x = , then carrier (1)1 2( , )s s  -- the carrier with the lowest rate for the bundle 
1 2{ , }s s   – is going to serve shipments 1 2{ , }s s  and will be paid an amount equal to 
(2) *(1) *(1)
1 2 1 2min ( ( , ), ( ) ( ))e s s e s e s
− −+ . The notation *−  is used to indicate that the winner, 
carrier that submitted (1) 1 2( , )e s s , is excluded from the sets that may determine the 
payment level   
d. If 1 0x =  and 12 0x =  carrier i  will serve 1s . 
e. If 2 0x =  and 12 0x =  carrier j  will serve 2s .  
 
Analysis and Evaluation of Incentive Compatible Dynamic Mechanisms for Carrier Collaboration 
Figliozzi 
 
9 
9
4.4  Bundle size 2: Pricing Strategies and Properties 
 
This extension conserves the IR, IC, and BB properties. In all cases a carrier payment 
cannot be influenced by its reservation value or cost submissions. As before, submitting 
service costs is a weakly dominant strategy. Participation and submission of arriving 
shipments is IR since the reservation value is not determined until the moment of the 
matching and carriers will never pay anything above the reservation value or serve any 
shipment whose cost is less than the payment received.  
 
In order to keep IC, it is necessary to keep the submission of the first shipment of the 
bundle secret. Otherwise, for the second arriving shipment the second carrier can use this 
knowledge to determine the price of the bundle and increase the reservation value for the 
second arriving shipment.  For a similar reason, after the CM has informed all carriers 
about a shipment arrival (the information is common knowledge), a shipment that was not 
assigned in the first attempt must be served by the initial carrier (point 10.d or 10.e). As in 
the case of the bundle size 1, the incentive compatibility constraints that are needed to 
simplify carriers’ estimation problem can potentially reduce the efficiency of the CM 
allocations.  
 
Dynamic bundling can exploit complementarities among arriving shipments but it also 
increases the size of the system profit maximization problem and carrier calculations 
exponentially with the size of the bundle. Not only the number of possible bundles grows 
exponentially with the number of shipments but also each cost estimation is in general an 
NP-hard problem [18]. Further, the intricacy of the cost/price estimation problem grows 
considerably in a dynamic stochastic setting [19, 20].  
 
In a dynamic setting is not only important that the size of the problem/computation time 
does not grow exponentially but also that the waiting time to form a bundle is not too long. 
For example, the carrier submitting the first shipment has a trade-off between waiting 
longer to form a bundle (potential obtainment of savings) and serving the shipment early to 
increase carrier serving capacity. Carries that submit shipments hoping to form a bundle 
must estimate a jt +  deadline time. In a deterministic environment this time is lower 
bounded by the arrival time and upper bounded by the latest pickup and delivery time and 
the location/status of the fleet.  
 
In the SPDCM with a bundle size 2 there is a probability of allocating single shipments -- 
bundle size 1 – when for example 1 1 2
jt t t+ < = . It can be speculated that as the shipment 
arrival rate decreases or the shipment time windows narrow the probability of forming 
larger shipments decreases. If the allowed bundle size is further increased trade-offs are 
likely to be found between potential bundling efficiencies, complexity of the CM, and the 
probability of forming large bundles (the average bundle size of the CM depends on the 
characteristics of the demand such as arrival rate and time windows).  
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5.  Simulation of a SPDCM bundle size 1 
 
In order to measure the savings that can be obtained using a SPDCM a hypothetical square 
geographic region with four identical carriers is simulated. It is assumed that the length of 
the square sides is equal to 1 unit of distance. For convenience, trucks travel at a constant 
speed equal to one unit of distance per unit of time. Demands for truckload pickup-and-
delivery arise over this area and over time. Origins and destinations of demands are 
uniformly distributed over the square area, so the average loaded distance for a request is 
0.52 units of distance. All the arrivals are random; the arrival process follows a time 
Poisson process. The expected inter-arrival time for each carrier is E [T] = 1/ (Kλ), where 
λ is the demand request rate per vehicle and K=2 for each carrier.  The arrival rate is the 
same for all carriers but the arrival times are simulated using a different random seed for 
each carrier. Three different Poisson arrival rates per truck per unit of time are simulated:  
 
• λ = 0.5  (uncongested) 
• λ = 1.0  (congested) 
• λ = 2.0  (extremely congested) 
 
The shipments have hard time windows. Three different time windows are simulated.  In 
all cases, it is assumed that the earliest pickup time is the arriving time of the demand to the 
marketplace. The latest delivery times (LDT), in an order that reflects increasing 
“slackness”, are the following: 
 
LDT1 = arrival time + 1 x (shipment loaded distance + 0.25) + 1 x uniform (0.0, 1.0) 
LDT2 = arrival time + 2 x (shipment loaded distance + 0.25) + 2 x uniform (0.0, 1.0) 
LDT3 = arrival time + 4 x (shipment loaded distance + 0.25) + 4 x uniform (0.0, 1.0) 
 
The respective time windows are respectively called TW1, TW2, and TW3. The first type 
of time windows (TW1) provides hardly enough flexibility of scheduling. The opposite can 
be said about the last type (TW3). It is also assumed that all the vehicles and loads are 
compatible; no special equipment is required for specific loads. In all the simulations, 
carriers estimate service costs using an optimal static formulation  developed by Yang et al. 
[21]. All the shipments have a reservation value distributed as uniform (1.42, 1.52). In all 
cases, reservation values exceed the maximum static incremental cost possible (therefore 
highest bid) in the simulated area (≈1.41 units of distance). 
 
Three different performance measures are used to evaluate the performance of the four 
carrier systems with and without SPDCM. The first is the carrier’s average empty distance 
or the average distance from the destination of one load to the origin of the next load 
served. Average empty distance is a measure of the allocation efficiency of the CM. The 
second performance measure is the number of shipments served. The third the sum of 
individual carrier profits (which equals for each carrier the sum of all served shipments 
shipper reservation values minus the distance incurred to serve them all). The first 
performance measure is related to the efficiency of the carriers, the second one is related to 
the efficiency of the mechanism, and the third one to the efficiency and performance of the 
mechanism.  
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5.1  Analysis of Results 
 
Figures 1 to 3 show the changes in average empty distance, total number of served 
shipments, and total system profit generated when the SPDCM is implemented. The 
system without SPDCM is used as a base for comparison. Figure 1 indicates that 
deadheading is reduced considerably across the board, improvements range from 24% to 
nearly 50%. The number of served shipments increased considerably with short time 
windows and at high arrival rates (Figure 2). The collaborative system clearly generates 
more system profit than a system of independent shipper-carrier pairs. In absolute terms, 
the additional system profit that is generated by the marketplace increases with the arrival 
rate. However, percentage-wise, the major increases correspond to short time windows 
and, in a lesser degree, to high arrival rates. Collaboration is increasing system’s capacity in 
constrained environments or with high arrival rates (Figures 2 and 3).  
 
5.2  Discussion 
 
The collaborative mechanism clearly outperforms the performance of the system when 
carriers act individually in the stylized simulation market. However, important assumptions 
were made that can be difficult to match in practice: a) customers do not object to being 
delivered by a truck/driver from a different company, b) all the vehicles and loads are 
compatible, c) CM implementation/operation costs are not considered, d) implementation 
of the CM and communications among carriers is flawless and in real-time, and e) the 
service areas of the carriers overlap completely. However, it is also clear that in some cases 
there could be substantial benefits from dynamic collaboration. Especially when each 
individual carrier has a substantial amount of empty miles and the service areas overlap. 
Further research is needed to understand how shipment bundle size affects the efficiency 
of the system.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper introduced a dynamic collaborative mechanism that is incentive compatible. 
This has clear advantages for participating carries since only service costs must be 
estimated avoiding price estimation problems that can easily become intractable or 
computationally expensive.  
 
Dynamic bundling can exploit complementarities among arriving shipments but it also 
increases the size of the system profit maximization problem and carrier calculations 
exponentially with the size of the bundle. Not only does the number of possible bundles 
grow exponentially with the number of shipments but cost estimation also becomes more 
difficult. Simulation results have shown that the collaborative mechanism can easily 
outperform a non-collaborative system when carriers’ service areas overlap and truck and 
loads can be easily swapped among carriers without affecting customer service 
requirements.   
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Figure 1 Empty distance improvement against base case (no-collaboration) 
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Figure 2 Shipment Served improvement against base case (no-collaboration) 
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Figure 3 Total system profit  improvement against base case (no-collaboration) 
 
